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Abstract
This paper studies the long-run fiscal consequences of balanced budget rules (BBR)
that are enshrined in a country’s constitution. Using historical data dating back
to the 19th century and applying a difference-in-difference approach we find that
the introduction of a constitutional-BBR reduces government debt-to-GDP and
expenditure-to-GDP ratios, on average, by around 11 and 3 percentage points, re-
spectively. We do not find evidence that BBRs affect tax revenues. Our analysis
indicates that such rules reduce the probability of experiencing a debt crisis and
that the effective enforcement of BBRs can be conditional on the quality of demo-
cratic institutions. In addition, we implement an instrumental variable approach
by instrumenting the probability of having budget rules on de jure constraints on
changing the constitution. This and other tests suggest that the relations we find
are largely causal going from BBRs to fiscal outcomes.
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1 Introduction
Average government debt-to-GDP and spending-to-GDP ratios around the world roughly
doubled in the 50 years after WWII. Compared to the few data points that we have
from the late 19th century, spending-to-GDP has roughly quadrupled by now (Figure
1). In a long and heated debate, both academics and policy-makers have questioned the
reasons behind running persistent deficits and the resulting accumulation of debt, and
have try to find effective solutions. The global economic crisis of 2008-09 quickly evolved
into a sovereign debt crisis in many countries, bringing again the issue of sustainable
public finances to the forefronts of policy-priorities and urging policy-makers to find
quick, effective, and credible fixes. In particular, fiscal rules have become a popular
policy-instrument to constrain fiscal policy and are being widely promoted by national
governments and international organizations (such as the IMF or the EU) alike.
However, the use of fiscal rules is not a new idea (e.g., think of US states or the Maastricht-
criteria in Europe) and the crisis showed that they can and do fail.1 As a response, a
recent trend – perhaps a belated one – has been to strengthen the credibility of these fiscal
rules by enshrining them in the highest level of law, that is into national constitutions.
Denmark, Italy and Spain are some of the cases that made such a move in the post-
crisis era and, in doing so, have joined Germany and Switzerland2 which are the two sole
exceptions among advanced countries that already had such rules. On the other hand,
there are about three dozen countries in the world – particularly in Africa and Central
and South America – that historically had such provisions in their constitutions (for a
map see Figure 2). Some of these provisions date back to the end of the 19th century, and
most were introduced in the first and second halves of the 20th century in the Americas
and Africa, respectively. Our aim in this paper is, therefore, to present the first historical
evidence on the fiscal-effects of these constitutional fiscal rules.
1For example, in the European Union, more than half of member states exceeded the 3% maximum
budget deficit specified in the Stability and Growth Pact.
2Germany first introduced a fiscal rule into its constitution in 1871 (re-stating it in 1949), while
Switzerland introduced it only in 1999. Portugal also had such a rule in the 1820s but it was short-lived.
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Figure 1: Evolution of average debt and expenditure with and without
balanced budget rules, 1880-2012
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Own calculations based on constitutional data from the CCP project (Elkins et al. 2014), and fiscal data
from Cage´ and Gadenne (2014) and Abbas et al. (2010). The sample includes countries with population
over 1,5 million and excludes outliers at top and bottom 1%. For a description of the sample, see Section
2.
The literature on the political economy of government spending and debt is vast. It
studies the question of why governments persistently spend and borrow at levels that
may deviate from the prescriptions of optimal fiscal policies and focuses on the set of
incentives shaping policy-makers’ behavior (Persson and Tabellini 2000; Drazen 2000).
For example, early work (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Brennan and Buchanan 1980) has
put forward the hypothesis of “fiscal illusion” which states that voters overvalue current
spending relative to the cost of future taxation, thus violating the inter-temporal budget
constraint and giving rise to a persistent deficit-bias. But even if voters put sufficient
weight on the cost of future taxation, politicians may still (strategically) over-spend; for
example, due to political business cycles. Systematic over-spending may also arise when
agents can free-ride on the “common-pool” of tax contributions (this argument perhaps
most clearly seen in federal contexts such as in Europe). In a recent paper, Alesina and
Passalacqua (2015) provide a thorough review of the theoretical literature on persistent-
deficits.
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Regarding fiscal rules, the existing literature focuses on evaluating the performance of
two types of rules. Ex-ante fiscal rules, defined as long-lasting constrains on fiscal policy
through numerical limits on budgetary aggregates such as budget deficits (Schaechter
et al. 2012), and procedural rules or also called fiscal institutions, like those regulating
the drafting, approval, and implementation of the budget (Von Hagen 1992; Poterba
and von Hagen 1999; Fabrizio and Mody 2006; Hallerberg et al. 2007). While the
latter approach is unlikely to bring immediate results, the former may introduce tensions
between reaching the goal of sustainable public finances and appropriate fiscal policies
(for a comparative discussion of these two approaches, see Wyplosz 2005, 2013). For
example, fiscal rules (even those equipped with certain escape-clauses) will very likely
introduce inflexibilities in running counter-cyclical fiscal policy, may discourage public
investment, and give rise to creative accounting (for a further discussion of the potential
effects of fiscal rules, see Debrun et al. 2008).
However, when the (political) distortions from optimal fiscal policies are large, imperfect
or second-best fiscal rules may become welfare improving. Still, it remains an empirical
question whether such rules can be effective, and if so, how big is their effect on fiscal
outcomes. These questions have been studied extensively on both sub-national (e.g.,
Poterba 1996; Feld and Kirchga¨ssner 2008; Grembi et al. 2016, respectively from US,
Switzerland and Italy) and national levels (e.g., Dahan and Strawczynski 2013; Tapsoba
2012, respectively from OECD and developing countries), and also on the supra-national
level (particularly in Europe, e.g., Hallerberg et al. 2007, 2009). These are only a few
examples from this abundant literature which we have no ambition to review here. We
instead refer to the literature meta-analysis by Heinemann et al. (2016) who find that
fiscal rules indeed constrain fiscal policies.
We contribute to the existing literature on the role of fiscal rules by, for the first time,
i) studying the effect of balanced budget rules (BBR) that are enshrined in national
constitutions, and ii) providing historical evidence dating back to the 19th century. About
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Figure 2: Constitutional balanced budget rules around the world
Notes: Shaded areas represent the countries (41 in total) that had a balanced budget rule between 1800 and 2015. List of
these countries by region (year BBR first introduced in paretheses):
Africa: Angola (2010), Benin (1960), Burkina Faso (1960), Cape Verde (1980), Central African Republic (1959), Chad
(1960), Cote d’Ivoire (1960), Republic of the Congo (1967), Egypt (2007), Gabon (1975), Guinea (1983), Mali (1960),
Mauritania (1961), Niger (1964), Rwanda (1962), Sudan (1973);
Central-America: Costa Rica (1949), Dominican Republic (1955), El Salvador (1939), Haiti (1983), Honduras (1873),
Nicaragua (1905), Panama (1983);
South-America: Brazil (1946), Chile (1980), Ecuador (1906), Uruguay (1942), Peru (1979);
Europe: Austria (2008), Denmark (2014), Germany (1871), Georgia (2013), Hungary (2011), Italy (2014), Latvia (2013),
Malta (2014), Portugal (1822), Serbia (2006), Spain (2011), Switzerland (1999), Ukraine (1996).
Source: Own compilation based on data from CCP project (Elkins et al. 2014), and IMF fiscal rules database (Budina
et al. 2012; Bova et al. 2015).
four dozen countries have ever introduced BBRs into their constitutions.3 Their study is
appealing because provisions written in a country’s constitution might be more binding
than traditional fiscal rules.4 Also, unlike numerical fiscal rules that specify a numerical
target, constitutional fiscal rules may be more ambiguous and general, thus allowing more
flexibility for sound fiscal policy.5
3See Figure 2 for a map and Table A1 for a list of these countries, and Table A8 for the relevant
paragraphs of the constitution describing the rule
4For example, in the United States, balanced budget/expenditure rules in the 80’s and 90’s were
phased out or abandoned, as corresponding laws were rewritten. Further, supranational deficit caps –
such as in the European Union – are also often exceeded.
5For example, Article 126 of the Swiss Constitution states: “The Confederation shall keep its expen-
diture and receipts in balance in the long term”. Although the term “in balance” is rather precise, this
rule does not provide with further clarity, in the words of Mr. Keynes, on whether long-term is bound
to one generation or not.
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Figure 1 plots the evolution of average levels of government debt (panel a) and expenditure
(panel b), as share of GDP, for countries with and without balance budget rules. These
averages hide considerable amount of heterogeneity both across time and countries as we
will see later on. However, the first evidence suggests lower levels of debt and expenditure
when constitutions include explicit fiscal provisions for balanced budgets.
Our largest sample goes back to the year 1800 and covers at most 224 countries. However,
since BBRs have little variation in the early years for countries with available data on
public finances, our preferred sample focuses on the post-1945 period and includes 132
countries. By estimating a difference-in-difference regression and controlling for popu-
lation composition, wealth, and quality of democracy, we find, first, a strong negative
association between constitutional-level BBRs and government expenditure and debt.
On average, countries with a BBR have debt-to-GDP and expenditure-to-GDP ratios
that are 11 and 3 percentage points smaller than those without such rules. This result
contributes to the literature studying the effects of fiscal rules by showing that the ef-
fect of constitutional-level rules is robust and economically relevant. This analysis also
contributes to the large literature on the economic effects of constitutions (e.g., Mueller
2003) and particularly to its more recent empirical or positive side (e.g., Persson and
Tabellini 2003; Voigt 2011) by presenting evidence of direct policy-effects from consti-
tutional provisions.
Our second result is that countries with BBRs are less likely to experience debt crises
(as measured by Rogoff and Reinhart 2010) even after controlling for the level of debt.
This is important for policy debates since ultimately we are interested not only in the
level of debt per se but on whether debt will reach unsustainable levels possibly leading
to a sovereign debt-crisis. To our knowledge, this link between BBRs and debt crisis has
not been previously established. Third, we study whether democratic institutions have a
role to play in translating the effect of these rules into fiscal outcomes, and find some but
partial evidence that the effective enforcement of BBRs is conditional on the quality of
democratic institutions.
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In addition to studying constitutional rules and providing historical evidence, our third
contribution is to improve over the existing literature in terms of methodology. The
effect of fiscal rules is generally not straightforward to identify because of selection-bias
(e.g., fiscal preferences), the potential reverse effect of fiscal outcomes on the probability
to implement rules, omitted variables, or other sources of endogeneity. We perform a
number of standard tests – such as showing that the results are not driven by outliers or
by short-run fluctuations, or that the assumption of parallel trends holds in our case –
to rule out the alternative explanations. However, we also suggest two new approaches
to isolate the causal relation between rules and fiscal policies. Both use an instrumental
variable strategy. The first test exploits the fact that the introduction or suspension
of a budget rule by definition requires to change the constitution itself. Therefore we
build an index of de jure constraints on changing the constitution (such as whether
a super-majority in the legislature or a public referendum is required) and instrument
the probability of having budget rules on this index to estimate its causal effect on fiscal
outcomes. However, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that constitutional rigidity
is related to fiscal outcomes in some other way. Therefore, in a second step we reverse
the relation and test for reverse causality coming from exogenous variation in debt and
spending (which is captured by the effect of natural disasters). These estimates suggest
that the relations we find are largely causal, going from BBR to fiscal outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data (with
greater details of the constitutional-variables since these are being used for the first time)
and summarizes our empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the main results, followed by
robustness tests and several extensions. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Data and Empirical Design
2.1 Data
Constitutional Data: This paper exploits a novel dataset that contains information
on the characteristics of national constitutions for all independent states since 1789 until
the present. The dataset was collected by the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP,
Elkins et al. 2014) and has been recently used in the political science and law literature
(among others, Elkins 2010; Cheibub et al. 2013; Ginsburg and Versteeg 2014; Melton
and Ginsburg 2014; Blo¨chliger and Kantorowicz 2015; Bjornskov and Voigt 2015).
Since the definition of what makes a constitution changes over time and across countries,
we first outline how the CCP defines a constitution. For every country-year observation a
document is defined as a constitution if it meets at least one of the following conditions: i)
the document is defined explicitly as the “Constitution”, “Fundamental Law”, or “Basic
Law” of a country; ii) the document contains explicit provisions that establish its contents
to be the highest level of law (either because the document is entrenched or it limits
future law); or iii) the document changes the basic pattern of authority by establishing
or suspending an executive or legislative branch of government.6
The dataset reports extensive information on general characteristics, electoral provisions,
the executive, legislative and judiciary branches, regulatory and oversight institutions,
among others. We focus on whether the constitution includes a provision for a balanced
budget and on how easy it is to amend the constitution. We discuss the details of these
variables in Section 2.2.
Historical Public Finance Data: Our objective is to identify if there is an association
between a country’s fiscal performance and the use of provisions for a balanced budget
in the constitution. Specifically, we focus on government’s debt, expenditure, and tax
revenue (as share of GDP) as measures of a country’s fiscal performance.
6For further details see Elkins et al. (2014) or visit: comparativeconstitutionsproject.org.
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Historical data on government expenditure and tax revenue is taken from Cage´ and
Gadenne (2014), and data on general government debt comes come from Abbas et al.
(2010).7 Both of these studies compile historical information from different sources and
are to the best of our knowledge the most extensive records available. Cage´ and Gadenne
(2014) collect information on government expenditures as far back as 1830, and Abbas
et al. (2010) report data on government debt as early as 1880.
In addition, we study domestic and external debt crises using the data from Rogoff and
Reinhart (2010). External debt crises are defined as a failure by the government to
meet an interest or principal payment on the due date. Domestic debt crises are defined
similarly but include episodes involving the freezing of bank deposits and/or forcible
conversions of such deposits from foreign to local currency.
Other Data: As control variables in our analysis we also include population size, per
capita income and quality of democracy. We proxy for the quality of a country’s democ-
racy using the Polity scores from the Center for Systemic Peace. The scores originally
range from -10 to 10, from complete autocracy to complete democracy, but for exposition
purposes we normalize the score to range between 0 and 1. The population and income
data come from the Maddison Project database.8 Specifically, income is measured as per
capita GDP in 1990 international dollars.9
Table 1 reports basic information on the sample (number of countries and median number
of years available per country), the usual summary statistics, and the sources of our main
variables.
7Abbas et al. (2010) define the general government sector as “all government units and all non market
nonprofit institutions that are controlled and mainly financed by government units, comprising the
central, state, and local governments. The general government sector does not include public corporations
or quasi-corporations”. However, due to data limitations for the earlier years in their sample, they use
central government debt whenever general government debt was not available.
8The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 version.
9The unit refers to Geary-Khamis dollars which is a fictional currency set to have the same purchasing
power parity as US dollars.
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Table 1: Summary statistics, time and country coverage, data-sources
Variable Countries Years Obs. Mean St.D. 10th 90th Source
(median) pct. pct.
Balanced Budget Rule 193 60 6,689 0.11 0.32 0.0 1.0 CCP
Population (million) 193 60 11,880 23.6 92 0.1 46 The Maddison Project
Per Capita GDP (ths. USD) 157 59 8,643 4.8 5.7 0.7 12.8 –
Polity Score 187 55 9,249 0.5 0.4 0.1 1.0 Center for Systemic Peace
Gen. Gov. Debt (% GDP) 177 41 7,011 56.3 60.3 12.6 105.5 Abbas et al. (2010)
Central Gov. Expenditure 128 29 4,068 25.5 13.1 12.0 41.8 Cage´ and Gadenne (2014)
Central Gov. Tax Revenue 130 29 4,157 18.0 9.3 8.2 31.7 –
Debt Crisis 70 211 14,132 0.12 0.33 0.0 1.0 Rogoff and Reinhart (2010)
2.2 Summary of Constitutional Variables
Balanced Budget Provision: We first describe the evolution in the number of con-
stitutions – or, in other words, the number of sovereign states that have a constitution –
over time. The left panel in Figure 3 shows that the share of independent countries with
constitutions increased steadily from 1816 until 1980.10 After 1980, almost all countries
had some form of a constitution.
Additionally, the left panel in Figure 3 also shows the share of countries (out of those
with constitutions) that have information on central government debt or spending. In
particular, after 1970 the share of countries with information on outcomes increases sub-
stantially. This jump is probably driven by the fact that most government financial
statistics from the IMF go as far back as 1970.
The right hand panel in Figure 3 reports the share of countries with a balanced budget
provision (out of those with constitutions). The inclusion of this provision is a recent
phenomenon that seems to have gained popularity starting in the 1950’s.
Substance of the Balanced Budget Provisions Our definition of a balanced budget
provision in the constitution is taken from the following question in the CCP question-
naire: Does the constitution specify that the budget must be balanced? This provision
10The data on the number of independent states over time is taken from the 2013 updated dataset of
Gleditsch and Ward (1999)
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Figure 3: Evolution of constitutional fiscal provisions over time
M
OM
4M
SM
UM
1MM
1UMM 1URM 19MM 19RM OMMM
year
phare Countries w/ Constitutions phare Countries w/ Constitutions C lutcomes
0
5
10
15
1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
year
Share Countries w/ BBR Share Countries w/ BBR & Outcomes
Notes: Own calculations based on data from Comparative Constitutions Project and Gleditsch and Ward
(1999).
is different from traditional budget balance rules in the sense that is not a numerical
constraint but more of an explicit commitment for a balanced budget. From here on we
refer to these provisions as constitutional balanced budget rules (BBR).
Overall, 36 countries in our sample ever had a BBR in their constitution. Table A1 of
the appendix lists these countries along with the periods when the BBR was in place
(column 3), and the periods for which data on government debt is also available (column
4).11
A closer look at Table A1 allows to make several observations. First, and as discussed
above, there are very few developed countries that historically had a BBR in their con-
stitution. The stronger presence of BBRs in less developed countries can perhaps be
explained by the argument that the political institutions of these countries often cannot
guarantee stable political commitments, thus forcing them to fill this credibility-deficit
by an explicit provision in the constitution. On the other hand, the recent global crisis
showed that the commitment to sustainable public finances by many developed countries
can also suffer a credibility-deficit. This is one of the reasons why many countries in
Europe – such as Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Spain and others – have introduced
BBRs into their constitutions following the crisis.
11Out of our outcome variables the richer dataset is on general government debt. If we look at periods
with BBRs and data on government expenditures the sample is smaller than the one depicted in the
last column of Table A1.
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We also note that several countries had constitutionalBBRs for very brief periods of time.
In most instances, such cases correspond to circumstances when the constitution was short
lived. Consider the cases of Ecuador (1996-1997), Niger (1989-1990), and Portugal (1822).
During the period 1996-1998 Ecuador adopted a new constitution every year and two of
those constitutions had explicit provisions for a balanced budget. Similarly, in 1989 Niger
adopted a new constitution that included a budget balance provision; however, the 1989
constitution was replaced in 1992. Finally, Portugal’s brief BBR of 1822 is due to the
turmoil of the liberal revolution and the revolts after the ratification of the constitution
in 1822.
A third observation is that most BBRs are incorporated into the constitution as a result
of a new constitution being adopted (about 90%) rather than through constitutional
amendments (about 10%). In particular, constitutions seem to be more short lived in
regions like Latin America and Africa than Western Europe. Table 2 reports the average
number of constitutions and amendments per country across different regions. Notice that
the average Latin American country has had about eight constitutions in comparison to
the average western European country that has had about three constitutions. Also, the
average African country has had about three constitutions, a high number considering
that most of the countries in the region obtained their independence in the 1960s.
Table 2: Frequency of Constitutional changes across regions.
Region Mean No. New Const. Mean No. Amendments
East Asia 3.75 19.25
Latin America 7.96 18.73
Middle East/N. Africa 2.67 17.33
Oceania 0.75 13.63
South Asia 2.50 17.75
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.63 15.00
W. Europe/U.S./Canada 2.95 32.50
Finally, we note that there are fairly large cross-country heterogeneities in how exactly
a budget rule is formulated. Table A8 reports the articles, or excerpts, describing the
BBR in each constitution (along with the approval year of the most recent constitution
12
or constitutional amendment in column 1). English translations of each constitution were
obtained at the website of the Constitute Project.12 Some of the countries in Table A1 are
not included in Table A8 because the Constitute Project only publishes the most recent
constitutions. Thus, we lack information on the text of BBRs incorporated in previous
constitutions and no longer included in the most recent constitution (i.e., Brazil, Ecuador,
Honduras, Haiti, Portugal, Rwanda, etc).
2.3 Estimation
We estimate a difference-in-difference specification of the following form:
yit = β0 + β1Dit + Xitβ + τt + λi + εit (1)
where indexes i and t refer to countries and years, respectively. yi,t is our measure of
fiscal performance, expressed as government’s debt, expenditure or tax revenue as share
of GDP in percentage points. Dit is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the constitution
specifies a BBR and 0 when it includes some fiscal provision but does require the budget
to be balanced. Xit is a 1 × k vector of controls including ln of population, ln of per
capita GDP, the polity score of democracy normalized between 0 and 1, and an indicator
variable for constitutional changes or amendments. We also include year and country
fixed effects, and cluster the standard errors by country.
The above specification may suffer from several sources of endogeneity. One concern that
relates to all constitutional variables is the possibility of an omitted variable bias. That is,
it might be the case that the factors that drive the implementation of these processes in
the constitution are also correlated with the fiscal outcomes being studied (see Acemoglu
2005). With this in mind, we include several control variables to account for biases coming
from observable factors. Regarding any unobservable factors – such as the often cited
possibility of fiscal preferences driving both the fiscal institutions and fiscal outcomes –
12See https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en
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we include country fixed effects that control for any time-constant factors.13 Because of
the likely event that some unobservable factors are not time-constant within the long
period that we analyze, we repeat our analysis using shorter time periods. Moreover,
we show that the common trends assumption holds in our difference-in-difference setup.
Additionally, we perform a selection on unobservables test in the spirit of Altonji et al.
(2005).
In the case of BBRs an additional concern is the possibility of reverse causality since the
implementation of fiscal rules might be triggered by a country’s bad fiscal performance14.
To mitigate this problem, in Section 3.5 we propose a new way of testing for the possibility
of reverse causality. The idea is to exploit variation in the incidence of natural disasters
as a plausibly exogenous predictor of spending and debt. Thus, in the reduced form, we
test for the effect of exogenous increases in spending and debt on the likelihood that a
country adopts a BBR.
To hedge against other potential sources of endogeneity and also against potential mea-
surement error, our final strategy is an instrumental variable design. In Section 3.5 we
exploit the fact that the introduction or termination of constitutional-level rules by defi-
nition requires changing or amending the constitution itself. Therefore we construct an
index on “de jure constraints on constitutional amendments” and use this as an instru-
ment for BBRs.
13In an attempt to untangle the endogenous relation between fiscal rules and fiscal performance Heine-
mann et al. (2014); Krogstrup and Wa¨lti (2008) develop proxies for voter preferences. After controlling
for fiscal preferences, these studies find evidence that fiscal rules have a positive effect on fiscal behavior
by serving as a signal of a commitment towards fiscal discipline.
14In such a case, fiscal rules might be implemented because politicians want to send a signal to voters
or the international community of a commitment towards fiscal discipline.
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3 Results
3.1 Baseline results: Government Finances
Table 3 reports the baseline results for Equation 1. Estimates on the full sample are
reported in columns 1-6, while in columns 7-12 the sample is restricted to the period
from 1945 to 2015. The dependent variables are debt, expenditures and tax revenues of
the central government - all in ratios to GDP and expressed in percentages. Note that
the sample size varies across regressions, from 110 to 133 countries, which depends on the
availability of the dependent variable. Given the historical nature of the data which may
contain potential inconsistencies, we estimate the equations by trimming the outliers of
the dependent variables at top and bottom 1% and 5% percentiles, respectively, at odd
and even numbered columns. All regressions include country and year fixed effects and
control for per capita GDP, population-size, polity index of democracy, and a dummy for
constitutional changes.15
The main result of Table 3 is a statistically significant negative and economically large
association between constitutional-level BBRs and government debt and expenditure,
but no statistically significant effect on tax revenues. These results hold both for the
historical sample and for the post-WWII sample. In our preferred specification on the
more recent sample, the adoption of a BBR in a constitution is associated with an average
decrease of debt-to-GDP of about 11 and expenditure-to-GDP of about 3 percentage
points (columns 7-10).
15We control for constitutional changes – that is the implementation of new constitutions or amend-
ments to existing ones – in order to isolate the effect of constitutional changes from the effect of (the
introduction or termination of) BBRs (which, be definition, imply a constitutional change).
15
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Regarding the control variables, both per capita GDP and population have negative
signs indicating that richer and more populous countries have lower levels of debt and
expenditure, but the coefficients are not always statistically significant. The polity index
of democracy has a positive coefficient, but again not always statistically significant.
3.2 Robustness of baseline results
Before presenting our further results we perform several robustness tests on the baseline
results. We replicate the analysis of Table 3 by testing: i) the effects on 10- or 5-year aver-
aged data to make sure short-run fluctuation do not drive our results, ii) the assumption
of parallel trends between treated and untreated units before and after the treatment, iii)
the robustness of results to different estimation techniques, iv) the robustness of results
to alternative definitions of BBR and a wider set of control variables, v) sensitivity of
results to certain influential observations, and vi) whether selection-bias could drive our
results.
Table 4: Robustness to short-run fluctuation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: Post-1800; decade-averages Post-1945; 5-year-averages
VARIABLES Debt Expenditure Tax revenue Debt Expenditure Tax revenue
Balanced budget rule -4.909 -4.362** -1.020 -12.399** -3.222** -1.039
(4.776) (2.017) (1.093) (5.757) (1.485) (1.234)
Ln per capita GDP -14.825 -3.900* -0.278 -23.886* -4.745** 0.481
(10.844) (2.207) (2.063) (12.194) (2.130) (1.399)
Ln population -6.399 -14.363*** -11.852*** -12.394 -20.499*** -16.724***
(8.882) (3.102) (2.634) (15.975) (3.703) (2.667)
Polity2 (normalized) 4.494 -1.092 -4.066* -6.640 -0.122 -1.592
(8.512) (2.455) (2.325) (6.564) (1.611) (1.453)
Constitutional change -9.989 2.214 0.854 -7.844* 0.739 0.640
(11.364) (2.624) (1.950) (4.406) (1.440) (0.886)
Observations 595 458 465 902 673 687
R-squared 0.355 0.527 0.560 0.375 0.395 0.517
Number of countries 133 112 114 131 111 113
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variables are specified as a share of GDP in %. All regressions include country and year fixed effects (not
reported). Standard errors are clustered by country.
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Robustness to short-run fluctuations: Table 4 estimates the baseline specification
on 10 (5)-year-averaged data for the post-1800 (1945) sample.16 This approach helps to
mitigate problems related to possible short-run fluctuations and also assures that outliers
do not drive the results.
The results from this exercise – collected in Table 4 – are very similar to the baseline
results of Table 3. The estimate for the effect of BBRS is statistically significant both
for debt and expenditures, and has a similar magnitude as before.
Parallel trends: With a dummy variable on the existence of BBRs and country and
year fixed effects, our specification is equivalent to a difference-in-difference design. There-
fore the assumption is not of random treatment but that trends of treated and non-treated
units are parallel. To test the validity of this assumption in Table A3 of the Appendix
we estimate the baseline models from columns (7) and (9) of Table 3 by adding lags and
leads of our treatment variable.
Figure 4: Debt and expenditure around the time of introducing a balanced budget rule
(a) Debt/GDP, % (b) Expenditure/GDP, %
Notes: Figures plot the coefficient estimates of BBRs from columns 1 and 2 of Table A3 for debt and
expenditure, respectively. Vertical lines present 95% confidence intervals.
The point estimates (along with the confidence intervals) for pre- and post- treatment
periods are plotted in Figure 4. These show that the effect of BBR before its introduction
16Note that the definition of the dependent variable of interest is slightly different compared to the
baseline model. Since we average the data over time-periods, the BBR variable here reflects the share
of years within the period that a constitution included such a rule.
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is not significantly different from 0. BBRs become effective in the year of the introduction
or in the proceeding year, and then are again not significant.
Robustness to estimation techniques: Table A4 of the Appendix replicates the
baseline results of Table 3, first, by controlling for the lagged dependent variable, and
second, by estimating the latter equation with a difference-GMM. The size of the point
estimates decreases, which is due to the downward-bias introduced by the lagged depen-
dent variable (Keele and Kelly 2006). However, the sign and statistical significance of
all baseline results remain robust.
Robustness to alternative definitions of BBR and a wider set of control vari-
ables: Table A5 presents further tests of the baseline results of Table 3: i) by addi-
tionally controlling for the occurrence of civil wars17 (columns: 1-2); ii) to an alternative
definition of BBR (columns: 3-4) which includes four further countries (see Table A1 for
the sample of countries having a BBR according to the baseline and alternative defini-
tions); and iii) to re-defining the BBR dummies to be 0 also for constitutions that do
not include any fiscal provisions.18 The results from these tests are broadly consistent
with our baseline results.
Sensitivity of results: Because the number of countries which ever had a BBR in
their constitution is not very large – about three dozen – one question is whether there
are influential countries that drive our results. To test this, in Table A6 we re-run the
baseline regression dropping each of the countries in the sample one at a time. We perform
this exercise both for debt and expenditure. The country-specific point estimates along
with the confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 5. We do not find any single influential
17Information on civil wars was taken from the database of Intra-state wars V.4.0 of the Correlates of
War Project.
18Previously we were comparing only those constitution that specify some fiscal provision in order to
make sure they are comparable. In this way we also control for the selection bias coming from the fact
that if a constitution specifies some fiscal provision it is more likely to also specify a BBR.
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country without which our main results for the average effect of either debt or expenditure
would not hold.
Figure 5: Sensitivity of baseline results to the exclusion of countries with BBR
(a) Debt/GDP, % (b) Expenditure/GDP, %
Notes: Figures plot the country-specific coefficient estimates (and 90% confidence intervals) of BBR
after dropping each of the countries that ever had a BBR one at a time. The full results are presented
in Table A6.
Selection on unobservables: In the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005) the idea of this test is
to construct a measure which estimates how much stronger the selection on unobservables
has to be compared to the covariates in order to explain away the estimated effect (see
also, e.g., Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Oster 2015; Baskaran 2015; Hener et al. 2015).
The results are collected in Table A7. The test shows that after controlling for country
and year fixed effects, unobserved variables would have to explain the effect of BBR
on debt and expenditure about 30 and 4 times more, respectively, (than the observable
covariates of the full model do) for the effect to be spurious.
3.3 Sovereign Debt Crises
In this section we again estimate Equation 1, but extend the dependent variable to
a dummy for (external and/or domestic) debt crises taken from Rogoff and Reinhart
(2010).
Table 5 shows that BBRs are associated with a smaller probability of having debt crises,
and that this effect holds even when controlling for the level of debt. The marginal
effects of column 1 (not reported) show that the size of the effects is fairly large with
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Table 5: Balance Budget Rules and Debt Crises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: Post-1945
VARIABLES Domestic and/or external debt crises
Method: OLS Poisson Logit Probit
Balanced budget rule -0.156*** -0.192*** -1.074** -1.276** -1.637*** -1.994** -0.831*** -1.005**
(0.041) (0.047) (0.426) (0.553) (0.548) (0.862) (0.292) (0.464)
Ln per capita GDP -0.256*** -0.243*** -2.195*** -1.843*** -4.878*** -3.869*** -2.441*** -1.973***
(0.071) (0.083) (0.338) (0.491) (0.549) (0.836) (0.267) (0.409)
Ln population 0.380*** 0.216** 3.978*** 3.669*** 7.511*** 6.590*** 3.809*** 3.538***
(0.116) (0.102) (0.556) (0.863) (0.795) (1.314) (0.392) (0.648)
Polity2 (normalized) -0.001 0.086 -0.040 0.124 0.559 1.185** 0.314 0.597*
(0.065) (0.058) (0.289) (0.325) (0.431) (0.572) (0.237) (0.306)
Constitutional change 0.000 -0.000 -0.058 -0.064 -0.091 -0.074 -0.008 -0.012
(0.016) (0.020) (0.128) (0.143) (0.199) (0.253) (0.108) (0.137)
Debt / GDP 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.037*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
Observations 2,795 2,276 1,822 1,367 1,794 1,321 1,794 1,321
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.220 0.231 0.458 0.521 0.446 0.513
Wald Chi2 260.1 194.7 900.7 799.7 876.4 788.2
Number of countries 57 57 38 36
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is a dummy for domestic and/or external debt crises taken from Rheinhart and Rogoff. All regressions
include country and year fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are clustered by country.
the introduction of a BBR reducing the probability of observing a debt-crisis by 16,7%.
Since the dependent variable is a dummy, Table 5 replicates the baseline results of a
linear OLS-model (columns 1-2), with a panel-poisson model (columns 3-4), and logit
and probit models with country and year dummies (columns 5-6 and 7-8).
While our result – that BBRs mitigate the probability of observing a debt crises – is
new to the literature and is interesting in its own right, it also re-enforces our previous
findings of the constraining role of constitutional BBRs in government’s borrowing and
spending decisions more generally.
3.4 The Role of Democratic Institutions
In this sub-section we extend our baseline results of Section 3.1 by asking whether demo-
cratic institutions have a role to play. Previously we have controlled for the level of
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Table 6: The Role of Democratic Institutions and Female Voting Suf-
frage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: Post-1800 Post-1945 Post-1800
VARIABLES Debt Expenditure Debt Expenditure Debt Expenditure
Balanced budget rule -1.565 1.255 -6.875 0.260 8.911 -2.135**
(7.874) (2.354) (6.815) (2.135) (13.753) (0.972)
x Polity2 (normalized) -4.669 -5.694 -7.813 -6.447*
(12.930) (3.470) (14.434) (3.338)
x Female suffrage -15.009 0.000
(13.863) (0.000)
Female suffrage 18.522** -1.275
(8.724) (2.512)
Polity2 (normalized) 5.002 0.310 -3.999 1.111 4.279 -0.241
(6.536) (1.380) (5.969) (1.258) (7.348) (1.381)
Ln per capita GDP -12.821 -4.419** -23.620** -4.357** -11.806 -3.795
(10.306) (2.144) (9.531) (2.139) (10.915) (2.341)
Ln population -7.983 -15.850*** -9.381 -20.314*** -13.777 -15.214***
(10.922) (2.802) (15.372) (3.771) (10.607) (2.845)
Constitutional change -1.034 0.171 -1.211 0.211 -0.947 0.114
(1.872) (0.396) (1.084) (0.387) (1.856) (0.395)
Observations 4,557 3,207 3,794 2,816 4,505 3,167
R-squared 0.316 0.552 0.364 0.411 0.327 0.552
Countries 133 111 132 110 131 110
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variables are specified as a share of GDP in %. All regressions include country and year fixed effects (not
reported). Standard errors are clustered by country.
democracy; however, it is possible that the enforcement of BBRs itself depends on well-
functioning democratic institutions.
To test this hypothesis in Table 6 we re-estimate the baseline regressions by including
an interaction term between the BBR dummy and the polity index of democracy. The
marginal effects are plotted in Figure 6. We do not find statistically significant effect
for debt, but observe clearly that the negative effects of BBRs on expenditure is only
effective when some democratic institutions are in place. An autocracy, it seems, does
not find it very costly not to comply with constitutional-level BBRs.
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Figure 6: Marginal Effects of Balanced Budget Rules depending on
Democratic Institutions
(a) Debt/GDP % (Table 6, col. 3)
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(b) Expenditure/GDP % (Table 6, col.4)
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Notes: Figures plot the marginal effects of BBRs on debt and spending (y-axis, % of GDP) depending
the polity index of democracy (x-axis, from autocracy to democracy). These relations are estimated in
Table 6. The background-histograms present the distribution of the sample according to the democracy
index.
As a final test, we have collected data on the dates when female universal voting-suffrage
was introduced in each country.19 Generally speaking, we can think of universal suffrage
as one important driver of the size of government (Aidt and Dallal 2008).
In columns 5-6 of Table 6 we test whether this proposition holds in our sample and,
building on this result, aim to test whether BBRs constrain this large shock. The
introduction of female voting suffrage is associated with an increase in debt-to-GDP; the
effect on expenditure is, however, not statistically significant. Interestingly, once BBRs
are in place, the effect of female suffrage on debt vanishes. Since suffrage rules were
implemented early on we cannot identify such an effect for the later periods where BBRs
became more common.
3.5 Causality
As discussed in Sections 2.3 and 3.2, the effect of BBRs on fiscal policies cannot be easily
interpreted causally because of different sources of endogeneity. One issue may have to
19The data comes from the project “Women suffrage and beyond: confronting the democratic deficit”.
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do with fiscal preferences of countries which could both determine the fiscal preferences
and be expressed in the constitution by a BBR. So far we have dealt with this issue
by controlling for several observable characteristics and by including fixed effects for un-
observables, but some bias coming from time-variant and unobservable fiscal preferences
may remain. A second issue has to do with reverse causality, i.e. a situation where a
BBR is introduced to or terminated from the constitution motivated by the current level
of debt or expenditures.
In this section we propose two new ways of isolating the causal relation between rules and
fiscal policies. Both use an instrumental variable strategy. While the first test somewhat
conventionally tries to find an exogenous instrument for rules, the idea of the second test
is to reverse the relation and test for reverse causality coming from exogenous variation
in debt and expenditure.
Instrumenting balanced budget rules: Generally it is hard to find an instrument
for BBRs, however our setting allows us to exploit the fact that the introduction or
termination of constitutional-level rules by definition requires changing or amending the
constitution itself. Therefore from the CCP data we create an index on “de jure con-
straints on constitutional amendments” and use this as an instrument for BBR. The
index takes a value of 1 (the weakest constraint) if the constitution can be amended by
the executive branch, 2 by the legislature, 3 by the legislature with a super-majority, 4
by a public referendum, and 5 (the strongest constraint) both by a super-majority in
the parliament and a public referendum (for a discussion of the role and measurement of
amendment difficulty, see, Ginsburg and Melton 2015).
The lower panel of Table 7 collects the first stage results. It shows that following the logic
above the stronger de jure constraints on amending the constitution get, the smaller is
the likelihood of adopting a BBR. Using this variation in the second-stage (upper panel
of Table 7) we show that our previous results can be replicated.
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The question is, of course, whether the de jure constraints on constitutional amendments
are not related to fiscal policies in some other way. In the next test we rely on data on
natural disasters which may arguably contain more randomness which we could exploit.
Table 7: 2SLS: Isolating the Causality between Balanced Budget Rules
and Fiscal Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7 (8)
Second-Stage
Sample: Post-1800 Post-1945
VARIABLES Debt Expenditure Debt Expenditure
1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5%
Balanced budget rule -4.083 -10.219*** -2.240* -1.613** -6.311 -12.599** -3.389*** -2.327***
(4.626) (3.473) (1.257) (0.791) (7.033) (5.082) (1.225) (0.827)
Ln per capita GDP -25.053** -13.109*** -4.883* -1.035 -32.222*** -12.621* -3.892 -0.421
(10.670) (4.846) (2.764) (2.351) (12.430) (6.644) (3.187) (2.473)
Ln population -27.681*** -19.209*** -16.846*** -9.807*** -41.931** -23.225** -19.431*** -10.746***
(8.212) (4.759) (4.994) (3.144) (16.565) (9.465) (6.903) (3.938)
Polity2 (normalized) -9.215 -7.474 -2.686 -0.383 -12.563 -8.256 -1.488 0.137
(6.830) (5.865) (1.904) (1.317) (8.052) (6.476) (1.703) (1.235)
Constitutional change -1.118 -0.007 0.197 0.447 -0.884 0.247 0.298 0.450
(1.465) (1.152) (0.587) (0.360) (1.529) (1.202) (0.506) (0.365)
R-squared 0.420 0.461 0.456 0.410 0.423 0.451 0.340 0.338
F 126.4 471.3 35.44 88.37 111.4 423411 70.02 45.69
First-Stage
VARIABLES Balanced Budget Rule
Index: de jure constraints on -0.064*** -0.055** -0.028** -0.021 -0.019 -0.011 0.004 0.003
constitutional amendments (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019)
Ln per capita GDP 0.004 0.035 -0.057 -0.071 -0.036 -0.020 -0.061 -0.071
(0.037) (0.046) (0.071) (0.080) (0.043) (0.046) (0.071) (0.082)
Ln population -0.027 -0.034 0.069 0.039 -0.139 -0.180 -0.107 -0.133
(0.059) (0.064) (0.057) (0.078) (0.113) (0.168) (0.153) (0.164)
Polity2 (normalized) 0.129 0.098 0.071 0.058 0.057 0.041 0.057 0.052
(0.082) (0.075) (0.086) (0.088) (0.061) (0.062) (0.085) (0.087)
Constitutional change -0.010 -0.009 0.010 0.009 -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 -0.003
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Observations 2,657 2,417 1,969 1,811 2,378 2,151 1,774 1,671
R-squared 0.148 0.150 0.147 0.145 0.079 0.099 0.052 0.057
Number of countries 123 122 102 99 122 121 101 97
First-stage F 7160 402.9 28.80 35.67 191.2 11.37 6.576 13.03
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variables are specified as a share of GDP in %. In the first stage the endogenous regressor – BBR – is regressed
on de jure constraints on changing the constitution. All regressions include country and year fixed effects (not reported).
Standard errors are clustered by country.
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Table 8: 2SLS Results: Determinants of Balanced Budget Rules
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second-Stage
VARIABLES Balanced Budget Rule
Debt / GDP -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Expenditure / GDP 0.030 1.083 0.029
(0.033) (38.221) (0.031)
Ln per capita GDP -0.120 -0.122 -0.097 -0.065 3.397 -0.070
(0.092) (0.096) (0.081) (0.118) (124.913) (0.113)
Ln population -0.126 -0.129 -0.082 0.211 9.940 0.197
(0.120) (0.124) (0.190) (0.344) (353.668) (0.331)
Polity2 (normalized) 0.074 0.074 0.082 0.107 1.421 0.105
(0.075) (0.076) (0.078) (0.099) (47.578) (0.096)
F 163.9 65.79 2352 48.52 0.0763 66.40
First-Stage
VARIABLES Debt/GDP, % Spending/GDP, %
Number of disasters per year 0.710* 0.708* -0.002 -0.003
(0.374) (0.373) (0.108) (0.108)
Total deaths, thousand 0.008* 0.008* 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln per capita GDP -13.566 -13.575 -13.335 -3.288 -3.289 -3.289
(15.160) (15.156) (15.140) (2.962) (2.962) (2.972)
Ln population -25.048* -25.054* -24.801* -9.237*** -9.243*** -9.238***
(13.846) (13.844) (13.816) (3.496) (3.496) (3.492)
Polity2 (normalized) -4.671 -4.663 -4.631 -1.251 -1.249 -1.252
(14.018) (14.016) (14.041) (2.457) (2.458) (2.457)
Observations 2,988 2,988 2,988 2,317 2,317 2,317
R-squared 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.271 0.271 0.271
Number of countries 54 54 54 46 46 46
Fist-stage F 13149 13319 21789 1208 1225 1255
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is a dummy for the existence of BBRs at the constitutional level. The endogenous regressors – debt
and spending in GDP – are regressed on natural disasters in the first stage. All regressions include country and year fixed
effects (not reported). Standard errors are clustered by country.
Instrumenting expenditure and debt: In the first stage of Table 8, government
expenditure and debt are regressed on natural disasters with the working hypothesis that
such disasters may increase borrowing to finance a recovery. In the second stage, we use
the disaster-induced variation in fiscal outcomes to test whether an exogenous increase
in spending and debt increases the likelihood of adopting BBRs.
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The first stage of this specification – presented in the bottom panel of Table 8 – shows that
the instruments have the predicted signs. Both the number of disasters per year and/or
the total casualty rates (entering the regression jointly in columns 1 and 4, and separately
in columns 2-3 and 5-6) are positively related to the levels of debt and expenditure. In
the second-stage estimates – presented in the upper panel of Table 8 – we do not find
evidence that higher debt or expenditure increase the probability of adopting a BBR.
This test provides suggestive evidence that our estimated effects of BBRs of around 11
percentage points on debt and around 3 percentage points on expenditure are close to
the unbiased parameters. This is, of course, not to say that debt and expenditure never
influence the decision to adopt a fiscal rule. However, we can argue that BBRs, especially
those at the level of the constitution, are not easily reviewed and are not influenced by
relatively small or rather short-run developments in government debt and expenditure.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we study the effects of constitutional balanced budget rules (BBRs) on
government finances. Applying a difference-in-difference approach on data from the 19th,
20th and 21st centuries for a large sample of countries we find that constitutional-level
BBRs reduce government debt-to-GDP and expenditure-to-GDP ratios, on average, by
11 and 3 percentage points, respectively. We do not find evidence that these rules also
affect tax revenues. An additional result is that the introduction of such rules also reduces
a country’s likelihood of experiencing a debt crisis by around 17%.
These results have important policy-implications especially for countries that suffer chronic
fiscal deficits and which frequently find themselves on the verge of sovereign debt crises.
As discussed earlier, fiscal rules have been and continue to be a popular policy-instrument
to solve the issue of persistent deficit-biases. However, as the global economic crisis has
shown national or supra-national fiscal rules often suffer a credibility-deficit and are fre-
quently not complied with. Perhaps not surprisingly, many countries in Europe that
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already had some form of a fiscal rule – such as Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Spain
and others – have decided to enshrine BBRs into their constitutions following the crisis.
Our evidence of a robust and sizable effect of constitutional-level rules on fiscal outcomes
provides strong support for this ongoing agenda of policy reform.
We conclude by offering several thoughts for future research. First, the cross-country
heterogeneities in how exactly a budget rule is formulated are fairly large. Future research
could study these rules in-depth and their relevant country-contexts, as well as whether
their stringency matters. Such a line of research would, however, need to also take into
account the sub-constitutional fiscal rules and their interactions with the constitutional
rules. Second, it is of interest to study not only the constitutional fiscal rules but also
the set of institutions which regulate the procedures for drafting and implementing the
budget. For example, the study of the relative powers of the executive and legislative
branches of the government could shed more light on the role of constitutional checks-
and-balances for fiscal policies. Third, we still do not fully understand the mechanism
driving to the implementation of numerical or constitutional fiscal rules. Regional studies
looking at the political environment at the time of the drafting of several constitutions
in Latin America, Africa, and Europe might shed some light on this matter. Finally,
our focus was on the effect of BBRs on the level of government debt and expenditure,
and on the occurrence of debt crises. It would be also important to understand the role
of BBRs in the actual conduct of fiscal policies, such as the cyclicality, structure, and
redistributive nature of these policies.
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Table A1: Sample of countries with constitutional balanced budget
rules (BBR)
No Country Period BBR in place Period BBR & data on debt
Baseline sample (BBR):
1 Angola 2010-2015 2010-2012
2 Benin 1960-1978; 1990-2015 1990-2012
3 Brazil 1946-1964; 1967-1968 1946-1961
4 Burkina Faso 1960-1965; 1970-1973; 1991-2015 1991-2015
5 Cape Verde 1980-1998 1981-1998
6 Chad 1960-1974 1970-1974
7 Chile 1980-2015 1980-2012
8 Costa Rica 1949-2015 1950-2012
9 Cote d’Ivoire 1960-2015 1979-2012
10 Ecuador 1906-1978; 1996-1997 1945-1969; 1997
11 Egypt 2007-2015 2007-2012
12 El Salvador 1939-2015 1951-1960; 1983-2012
13 Central African Republic 1959-1963 N/A
14 Gabon 1975-2015 1975-2012
15 Germany 1871-1918; 1949-2015 1880-1913; 1950-2012
16 Guinea 2010-2015 2010-2012
17 Haiti 1983-1986 1983-1986
18 Honduras 1873-1779; 1893-1903; 1908-1935 1926-1935
19 Republic of the Congo 1967-1977 1970-1977
20 Dominican Republic 1955-1962 1954
21 Mali 1960-2015 1974-2012
22 Mauritania 1961-2015 1977-1979; 1990-2012
23 Nicaragua 1905-1973; 1987-2015 1970-1973; 1987-2012
24 Niger 1964-1973; 1989-1990; 1996-2015 1970-1973; 1989-1990; 1995-2012
25 Panama 1983-2015 1983-2012
26 Peru 1979-2015 1979-2012
27 Portugal 1822-1822 N/A
28 Rwanda 1962-1994 1970-1994
29 Sudan 1973-1984 N/A
30 Switzerland 1999-2015 1999-2012
31 Ukraine 1996-2015 1995-2012
32 Uruguay 1942-1951 N/A
Additional sample (BBR2):
33 Austria 2008-2015 2008-2012
34 Spain 2011-2015 2011-2012
35 Serbia 2006-2015 2006-2012
36 Hungary 2011-2015 2011-2012
Recently introduced (source: IMF):
37 Denmark 2014-2015 N/A
38 Georgia 2013-2015 N/A
39 Italy 2014-2015 N/A
40 Latvia 2013-2015 N/A
41 Malta 2014-2015 N/A
Source: CCP dataset, and IMF fiscal rules database (Budina et al. 2012; Bova et al. 2015).
Note: The CCP dataset classifies some countries as actually having a BBR (balbudgt=1) and others as having some type of
provision that is not as explicit (balbudgt=96) or that coders can not properly classify (balbudgt=97). The first thirty-two
countries in the above table are classified in the CCP database as having a BBR over the indicated periods. Out of those
coded as 96 or 97 we identify four additional countries as actually having a BBR (countries 33 to 36). Additionally, rows
37-41 indicate countries that have introduced constitutional BBR since 2013 (according to the IMF).
Table A2: Sample of countries with constitutions
Country Years Country Years Country Years
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
1 Abkhazia 9 76 Guatemala 178 166 151 Parma 73
2 Afghanistan 170 75 77 Guinea 58 50 6 152 Peru 195 141 37
3 Albania 103 84 78 Guinea-Bissau 43 32 153 Philippines 76 74
4 Algeria 69 20 79 Guyana 50 50 154 Poland 100 78
5 Andorra 227 23 80 Haiti 200 136 4 155 Portugal 227 97 1
6 Angola 41 41 6 81 Hanover 58 156 Qatar 46 13
7 Antigua and Barbuda 35 35 82 Hesse Electoral 66 157 Rep. of Vietnam 22 16
8 Argentina 202 177 83 Hesse Grand Ducal 66 158 Romania 139 117
9 Armenia 30 21 84 Honduras 179 121 23 159 Russia 227 99
10 Australia 115 115 85 Hungary 98 68 160 Rwanda 54 46 33
11 Austria 98 96 86 Iceland 77 72 161 Saint Kitts and Nevis 33 33
12 Austria-Hungary 130 87 India 69 67 162 Saint Lucia 38 38
13 Azerbaijan 27 21 88 Indonesia 71 66 163 St Vincent and Grenadines 36 30
14 Baden 83 54 89 Iran 227 110 164 Samoa 54 54
15 Bahamas 43 43 90 Iraq 85 54 165 Sao Tome and Principe 41 41
16 Bahrain 45 43 91 Ireland 96 94 166 Saudi Arabia 85 24
17 Bangladesh 45 40 92 Israel 68 167 Saxony 66
18 Barbados 50 50 93 Italy 227 82 168 Senegal 56 56
19 Bavaria 83 64 94 Jamaica 54 54 169 Serbia 51 15
20 Belarus 25 22 95 Japan 227 127 170 Serbia and Montenegro 3 3
21 Belgium 186 185 96 Jordan 70 70 171 Seychelles 43 37
22 Belize 35 35 97 Kazakhstan 25 21 172 Sierra Leone 55 49
23 Benin 57 43 32 98 Kenya 53 53 173 Singapore 56 53
24 Bhutan 67 11 99 Kiribati 37 37 174 Slovak Republic 24 24
25 Bolivia 191 144 100 Korea 122 175 Slovenia 25 25
26 Bosnia and Herz. 25 21 101 Kosovo 8 8 176 Solomon Islands 38 38
27 Botswana 50 50 102 Kuwait 55 42 177 Somalia 55 28
28 Brazil 194 188 21 103 Kyrgyz Rep. 25 19 178 South Africa 107 55
29 Brunei 23 23 104 Laos 65 38 179 South Korea 68 68
30 Bulgaria 138 122 105 Latvia 48 44 180 South Ossetia 9
31 Burkina Faso 56 35 10 106 Lebanon 76 76 181 South Sudan 5 5
32 Burundi 55 28 107 Lesotho 50 30 182 Spain 227 144
33 Cambodia 64 56 108 Liberia 170 138 183 Sri Lanka 74 45
34 Cameroon 56 56 109 Libya 83 55 184 Sudan 61 39 12
35 Canada 151 149 110 Liechtenstein 210 103 185 Suriname 41 34
36 Cape Verde 41 36 19 111 Lithuania 50 43 186 Swaziland 49 48
37 Central African Rep. 57 46 5 112 Luxembourg 152 148 187 Sweden 227 207
38 Chad 57 36 15 113 Macedonia 25 25 188 Switzerland 227 74 17
39 Chile 201 184 36 114 Madagascar 138 54 189 Syria 73 50
40 China 227 89 115 Malawi 52 52 190 Taiwan 69 69
41 Colombia 188 174 116 Malaysia 59 59 191 Tajikistan 25 17
42 Comoros 41 38 117 Maldives 51 18 192 Tanzania 56 37
43 Congo 56 48 118 Mali 56 50 50 193 Thailand 227 57
44 Costa Rica 180 75 67 119 Malta 52 52 194 Tibet 39 1
45 Cote d’Ivoire 57 55 55 120 Marshall Isl. 31 27 195 Timor 14 14
46 Croatia 25 121 Mauritania 57 44 44 196 Togo 56 43
47 Cuba 115 106 122 Mauritius 48 47 197 Tonga 48 47
48 Cyprus 56 56 123 Meckl. Schwerin 83 198 Transvaal 59
49 Czech Republic 23 23 124 Mexico 196 110 199 Trinidad and Tobago 54 54
50 Czechoslovakia 75 40 125 Micronesia 31 27 200 Tunisia 154 54
51 Dem. Rep. Congo 56 46 126 Modena 73 201 Turkey 226 92
52 Denmark 227 167 127 Moldova 26 26 202 Turkmenistan 25 24
53 Djibouti 39 24 128 Monaco 227 99 203 Tuscany 73
54 Dominica 38 38 129 Mongolia 95 90 204 Tuvalu 38 38
55 Dominican Rep.c 175 143 8 130 Montenegro 59 21 205 Two Sicilies 73
56 Ecuador 186 155 55 131 Morocco 176 54 206 Uganda 54 29
57 Egypt 123 69 7 132 Mozambique 41 41 207 Ukraine 28 20 20
58 El Salvador 177 121 50 133 Myanmar 139 37 208 United Arab Emirates 45 45
59 Equatorial Guinea 48 39 134 Namibia 26 26 209 United Kingdom 237 223
60 Eritrea 23 19 135 Nauru 48 48 210 United States 228 228
61 Estonia 49 42 136 Nepal 227 58 211 Uruguay 186 184 10
62 Ethiopia 161 72 137 Netherlands 227 201 212 Uzbekistan 25 24
63 Fed.Rep. Central America 17 5 138 New Zealand 119 116 213 Vanuatu 37 36
64 Fiji 46 42 139 Nicaragua 178 158 59 214 Vatican 84 1
65 Finland 99 97 140 Niger 56 40 32 215 Venezuela 191 131
66 France 228 103 141 Nigeria 56 32 216 Vietnam 141 56
67 Gabon 57 56 41 142 North Korea 68 68 217 Wuerttemburg 66
68 Gambia 53 31 143 Norway 139 218 Yemen 25 24
69 Georgia 26 24 144 Oman 227 5 219 Yemen Arab Rep. 73 12
70 German Dem. Rep.c 42 19 145 Orange Free State 57 220 Yemen People’s Rep. 24 21
71 Germany 224 144 115 146 Pakistan 69 27 221 Yugoslavia 85 82
72 Ghana 64 38 147 Palau 24 2 222 Zambia 52 52
73 Great Colombia 10 148 Panama 113 101 33 223 Zanzibar 2
74 Greece 190 83 149 Papua New Guinea 41 224 Zimbabwe 51 17
75 Grenada 42 30 150 Paraguay 205 172
Source: CCP dataset. Table presents the population of countries with coded constitutions. Columns 1-3 present the total
number of years with: (1) constitution, (2) some fiscal provision enshrined in the constitution, and (3) balanced budget
rule in the constitution.
Table A3: Trends in debt and expenditure before and after introducing
a balanced budget rule
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: Post-1945
VARIABLES Debt Expenditure Debt Expenditure Debt Expenditure
t-3 1.210 -2.229* 2.401 -2.023
(8.711) (1.280) (7.911) (1.250)
t-2 -0.586 -0.221 -0.244 -0.357
(2.275) (0.491) (2.391) (0.313)
t-1 4.700 -1.030 3.162 -0.859
(3.971) (0.981) (4.210) (0.751)
t -7.869* -0.002 -17.516*** -0.970 -2.698 -2.352
(4.448) (1.632) (5.217) (0.851) (7.808) (2.314)
t+1 -13.002** -1.299** -11.507** -1.292**
(6.426) (0.568) (5.563) (0.532)
t+2 -4.025 -0.630 0.197 -1.123
(6.695) (0.608) (4.226) (0.752)
t+3 8.456 0.724 3.866 0.777
(14.888) (3.504) (14.551) (3.391)
Ln per capita GDP -22.429** -4.836** -22.083** -4.332* -23.559** -4.631**
(10.345) (2.387) (9.860) (2.329) (10.007) (2.237)
Ln population -11.082 -20.555*** -10.443 -19.896*** -10.110 -20.931***
(15.188) (4.014) (14.881) (3.854) (15.721) (3.935)
Polity2 (normalized) -5.681 -0.506 -4.465 -0.330 -5.977 0.008
(6.878) (1.336) (6.222) (1.304) (6.772) (1.263)
Constitutional change -1.068 0.179 -1.116 0.145 -1.214 0.238
(1.254) (0.430) (1.129) (0.398) (1.224) (0.425)
Observations 3,443 2,567 3,663 2,725 3,552 2,638
R-squared 0.343 0.422 0.350 0.412 0.356 0.417
Number of countries 129 108 131 109 131 110
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variables are specified as a share of GDP in %. t is the year of treatment, i.e. the year when balanced budget
rule is introduced into the constitution. All regressions include country and year fixed effects (not reported). Standard
errors are clustered by country. Figure 4 presents the results graphically.
Table A4: Robustness to methods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: Post-1945
VARIABLES Debt Expenditure
Method: Baseline Dynamic Difference Baseline Dynamic Difference
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
Balanced budget rule -11.105** -3.077*** -2.996*** -3.504*** -1.567*** -1.525***
(5.216) (1.170) (1.159) (0.856) (0.478) (0.519)
Debt / GDP (t-1) 0.843*** 0.837***
(0.024) (0.026)
Expenditure / GDP (t-1) 0.629*** 0.620***
(0.118) (0.145)
Ln per capita GDP -23.349** -0.891 -1.224 -4.177* -1.377 0.887
(9.457) (1.754) (1.859) (2.173) (0.932) (0.726)
Ln population -9.519 -5.395** -5.730** -20.261*** -7.783*** -4.491**
(15.384) (2.498) (2.683) (3.771) (2.718) (1.933)
Polity2 (normalized) -5.143 -4.764*** -4.604*** 0.268 0.063 0.289
(6.170) (1.399) (1.473) (1.204) (0.554) (0.590)
Constitutional change -1.185 0.026 0.112 0.202 0.231 0.370*
(1.094) (0.498) (0.496) (0.389) (0.211) (0.218)
Observations 3,794 3,629 3,465 2,816 2,737 2,652
R-squared 0.364 0.857 0.855 0.407 0.716 0.712
Number of countries 132 132 131 110 110 107
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table presents robustness tests of the baseline results (Columns 7 and 9 of Table 3) to estimation methods. Dependent
variables are specified as a share of GDP in %. All regressions include country and year fixed effects (not reported).
Standard errors are clustered by country.
Table A5: Robustness to controls and alternative definitions of BBR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: Post-1945
VARIABLES Debt Expenditure Debt Expenditure Debt Expenditure
Balanced budget rule -11.045** -3.504***
(5.261) (0.856)
Balanced budget rule 2 -10.602** -3.504***
(5.218) (0.856)
Balanced budget rule 3 -11.338*** -2.136
(3.510) (1.567)
Ln per capita GDP -23.907** -4.172* -23.916** -4.172* -22.709*** -2.833
(9.670) (2.174) (9.673) (2.174) (7.916) (2.045)
Ln population -10.256 -20.229*** -10.283 -20.229*** -7.638 -16.486***
(15.469) (3.767) (15.480) (3.767) (13.595) (3.263)
Polity2 (normalized) -4.869 0.241 -4.895 0.241 1.162 -0.230
(6.185) (1.211) (6.187) (1.211) (5.358) (1.231)
Constitutional change -1.186 0.202 -1.181 0.202 -1.256 0.094
(1.092) (0.388) (1.092) (0.388) (1.074) (0.324)
Civil war 4.948 -0.188 4.956 -0.188 6.310 -0.532
(4.105) (0.634) (4.105) (0.634) (4.536) (0.550)
Observations 3,797 2,816 3,797 2,816 5,274 3,946
R-squared 0.366 0.407 0.366 0.407 0.350 0.360
Number of ifs 132 110 132 110 147 124
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table presents robustness tests of the baseline results (Columns 7 and 9 of Table 3) to the inclusion of more control
variables and to alternative definition of BBR (see Table A1 for the sample of countries with BBR). Dependent variables
are specified as a share of GDP in %. All regressions include country and year fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors
are clustered by country.
Table A6: Sensitivity to influential observations
Debt Expenditure
No Dropped country β s.e. N β s.e. N
1 Angola -11.385** (5.349) 3,471 -2.818*** (0.615) 2,656
2 Benin -12.298** (5.960) 3,453 -3.208*** (0.618) 2,629
3 Brazil -11.126* (5.922) 3,435 -2.511*** (0.816) 2,604
4 Burkina Faso -11.429** (5.369) 3,464 -2.819*** (0.619) 2,642
5 Cape Verde -10.296* (5.611) 3,455 -2.818*** (0.615) 2,656
6 Central African Republic -11.438** (5.415) 3,454 -2.815*** (0.613) 2,640
7 Chile -8.788* (5.061) 3,447 -3.308*** (0.913) 2,597
8 Costa Rica -11.479** (5.394) 3,426 -2.824*** (0.632) 2,627
9 Democratic Republic of the Congo -10.792* (5.827) 3,454 -2.818*** (0.615) 2,656
10 Dominican Republic -11.461** (5.345) 3,443 -2.826*** (0.633) 2,624
11 Ecuador -11.181* (6.149) 3,430 -2.966*** (0.645) 2,628
12 Egypt -11.759** (5.652) 3,438 -2.823*** (0.611) 2,634
13 El Salvador -11.409** (5.356) 3,455 -2.817*** (0.617) 2,638
14 Gabon -12.085** (5.744) 3,443 -2.883*** (0.567) 2,627
15 Germany -11.468** (5.354) 3,424 -2.834*** (0.613) 2,610
16 Guinea -11.463** (5.382) 3,463 -2.823*** (0.604) 2,636
17 Haiti -11.347** (5.611) 3,443 -2.674*** (0.687) 2,629
18 Honduras -11.434** (5.457) 3,436 -2.801*** (0.641) 2,626
19 Nicaragua -11.039** (5.549) 3,469 -2.820*** (0.618) 2,640
20 Niger -11.420** (5.383) 3,463 -2.819*** (0.614) 2,646
21 Panama -16.859*** (3.372) 3,437 -2.820*** (0.616) 2,634
22 Peru -11.429** (5.360) 3,453 -2.817*** (0.624) 2,630
23 Portugal -11.417** (5.382) 3,420 -2.819*** (0.631) 2,604
24 Rwanda -10.465* (5.574) 3,453 -2.512*** (0.617) 2,636
25 Sudan -11.417** (5.359) 3,473 -2.818*** (0.615) 2,656
26 Switzerland -11.422** (5.363) 3,472 -2.817*** (0.614) 2,649
27 Uruguay -11.414** (5.365) 3,443 -2.822*** (0.635) 2,607
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table presents sensitivity-tests of the baseline results (Columns 8 and 10 of Table 3) to one-by-one dropping each of the
countries that ever had a balanced budget rule. Sample is the post-1945 period. Dependent variables are specified as a
share of GDP in %. β is the coefficient of the balanced budget rule dummy, s.e. is the corresponding standard error
clustered by country, and N is the number of observations after dropping the country.
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Table A8: Constitutional Balanced Budget Rules
Country Definition
Angola; Constitution
Issued:2010; Article 104
(par. 2)
The State Budget shall be a single budget, shall estimate the level of revenue to be obtained and shall set limits for
authorized expenditure in each financial year for all services, public institutions, autonomous funds and social security,
in addition to those of the local authorities, in order ensure that all estimated expenditure is financed.
Austria; Constitution
Issued:1920
Reinstated:1945;
Article 13 (par. 2)
The Federation, the Laender, and the municipalities must aim at the securement of an overall balance and
sustainable balanced budgets in the conduct of their economic affairs. They have to coordinate their budgeting
with regard to these goals.
Benin; Constitution
Issued:1990; Article 110
(par. 1)
The National Assembly shall vote a balanced budget. If the National Assembly has not come to a decision by
December 31, the provisions of the appropriations bill may be enforced by edict.
Burkina Faso;
Constitution
Issued:1991
Amended:2012; Article
120
The proposals and amendments concerning the law of finance deposited by the members of the Parliament
are not receivable when their adoption would have as a consequence, either a diminution of public
resources, or the creation or the increase of a public expense, unless they should be accompanied by a proposal
for augmentation of receipts or of equivalent economies.
Chile; Constitution
Issued:1980
Amended:2012; Article
67
The Bill of the Law of the Budgets must be presented by the President of the Republic to the National Congress at least
three months prior to the date on which it must enter into force; and if the Congress has not acted on it within sixty
days counted from its presentation, the Bill presented by the President of the Republic will be effective [regir].
The National Congress cannot augment or diminish the estimate of the revenues; [it] can only reduce the
expenditures contained in the Bill of the Law of the Budgets, except for those established by permanent law.
The estimation of the returns of the resources stated in the Law of the Budgets and of the new ones established by
another initiative of law will correspond exclusively to the President, previously informed by the respective technical
agencies. The Congress cannot approve any new expenditures with [a] charge to the funds of the Nation
without indicating, at the same time, the sources of the funds necessary to meet such expenditures.
If the source of funds granted by the Congress were insufficient to finance any new expenditures that it
approved, the President of the Republic, upon promulgating the law, after a favorable report from the service or
institution through which new income is collected, countersigned by the Office of the Comptroller General of the
Republic, must proportionately reduce all expenditures, regardless of their nature.
Costa Rica; Issued:1949
Amended:2011; Article
179
The Assembly may not augment the expenditures budgeted by the Executive Power, if the new revenues
that should cover them are not specified, [with] previous report of the Office of the Comptroller General of the
Republic on the fiscal effectiveness of them.
Ivory Coast;
Constitution Issue:2000
Amended:2004; Article
80
The National Assembly is seized with the bill of the Law of Finance from the opening of the October session. The bill
of the Law of Finance must provide the receipts necessary for the integral covering of expenses. The
National Assembly votes the balanced budget. If the National Assembly has not decided within a time period of
seventy days, the bill of law can be put into force by ordinance. The President of the Republic seizes, for the
ratification, the National Assembly convoked in extraordinary session, within a time limit of fifteen days. If the
National Assembly has not voted the budget by the end of this extraordinary session, the budget is definitively
established by ordinance. If the bill of the Law of Finance has not been deposited in a timely way to be promulgated
before the beginning of the exercise, the President of the Republic demands of the National Assembly by urgency, the
authorization to repeat the budget of the previous year by provisional twelfths.
Dominican Republic;
Constitution Issue:2010;
Article 233
The preparation of the Bill of the Law of the General Budget of the State corresponds to the Executive Power, which
contemplates the probable incomes, the proposed expenses and the financing required, conducted within a framework of
fiscal sustainability, and assuring that the public indebtedness is compatible with the capacity for payment
of the State.
Egypt; Constitution
Issue:2014; Article 124
The state budget includes all of its revenue and expenditure without exception. The draft budget is
submitted to the House of Representatives at least 90 days before the beginning of the fiscal year. It is not considered in
effect unless approved thereby, and it is put to vote on a chapter-by-chapter basis.
The House may modify the expenditures in the draft budget law, except those proposed to honor a specific state
liability. Should the modification result in an increase in total expenditure, the House shall reach an
agreement with the government on the means to secure revenue resources to achieve a balance between
them. The budget is issued in a law, which may include modification to any existing law to the extent necessary to
realize such balance.
In all cases, the budget law may not include any text that incurs new burdens on citizens.
The specifics of the fiscal year, the method of budget preparation, the provisions of the budgets of institutions, public
bodies, and their accounts are defined by law.
The approval of the House of Representatives is necessary for the transfer of any funds from one chapter of the budget to
another, as well as for any expenditure not included therein or in excess of its estimates. The approval is issued in a law.
El Salvador;
Constitution
Issued:1983
Amended:2003; Article
226
The Executive Organ, through the appropriate Branch, shall have the direction of the public finances, and shall be
especially bound to maintain a balanced Budget, insofar as this is compatible with the fulfillment of the
purposes of the State.
Hungary; Constitution
Issued:2011; Article N
Hungary shall enforce the principle of balanced, transparent and sustainable budget management.
Parliament and the Government shall have primary responsibility for the enforcement of the principle set out in
Paragraph (1).
In the course of performing their duties, the Constitutional Court, courts, local governments and other state organs
shall be obliged to respect the principle set out in Paragraph (1).
Morocco; Constitution
Issued:2011; Article 77
The Parliament and the government see to the preservation of the balance of the finances of the State.
The government may oppose, in substantiated manner, the receivability [irrecevabilite] of any proposal or amendment
formulated by the members of Parliament when their adoption could have as a consequence, in relation to the law of
finance, either a diminishment of the public resources, or the creation or aggravation of a public expenditure [charge].
Table A8: Constitutional Balanced Budget Rules (cont.)
Country Definition
Gabon, Constitution
Issued:1991
Amended:1997; Article
48
All resources and obligations of the State must, for each financial exercise, be evaluated and inscribed into the annual
Bill of the Law of Finance filed by the Government before the National Assembly thirty (30) days at most after the
opening of the second ordinary session.
If, at the end of the budgetary session, the Parliament adjourns without having passed a balanced budget,
the Government shall be authorized to repromulgate by ordinance the preceding budget. This ordinance
may in spite of this provide for, in case of necessity, any reduction of expenditures or increase in revenues. Upon the
demand of the Prime Minister, Parliament is convoked in two weeks in extraordinary session for a new deliberation. If
Parliament has not passed the balanced budget at the end of this extraordinary session, the budget shall be definitively
established by ordinance taken in the Council of Ministers and signed by the President of the Republic.
The new revenues which may be created, if they consist of direct taxes and contributions or similar taxes, become
effective the first of January. The Court of Accounts assists the Parliament and the Government in the control of the
execution of the Law of Finance. The bill of the law of regulation, established by the Government, accompanied by the
general declaration of conformity and of general report of the Court of Accounts, must be filed before the Parliament at
the latest at the beginning of the first ordinary session of the second year which follows the exercise of the execution of
the budget concerned.
Mali; Constitution
Issued:1992; Article 77
The National Assembly shall consider the appropriations bill at the opening of the ordinary session preceding the fiscal
period. The appropriations bill must anticipate the income necessary for completely meeting all
expenditures.
If the National Assembly has not acted on this matter before the beginning of the fiscal period or if it has not passed
the budget, the Government shall resubmit the proposed budget within fifteen days to the National Assembly convened
in special session for this purpose.
The National Assembly shall then act within eight days. If this deliberation has not resulted in a budgetary vote, it
shall be automatically established by the Government on the basis of the revenues of the preceding fiscal period and
after consultation with the Supreme Court.
Mauritania;
Constitution
Issued:1992
Amended:2012; Article
68
(Paragraph 4) If the Parliament has not voted on the budget in a time period of sixty days (60) days, or if it did not
vote it in balanced form, the Government returns [renvoie] the Bill of the Law of Finance within fifteen (15) days to
the National Assembly.
(Paragraph 6) The Parliament controls the execution of the budget of the State and [the] annexed budgets. A statement
of expenses will be provided to the Parliament at the end of each six months [semestre] for the previous six months. The
definitive accounts of a fiscal year [exercise] are deposited during the course of the budgetary session of the following
year and approved by a law.
Germany; Constitution
Issued:1949
Amended:2012; Articles
109, 110, 115, 143d
(Article 109 - paragraph 3) The budgets of the Federation and the La¨nder shall in principle be balanced
without revenue from credits. The Federation and La¨nder may introduce rules intended to take into account,
symmetrically in times of upswing and downswing, the effects of market developments that deviate from normal
conditions, as well as exceptions for natural disasters or unusual emergency situations beyond governmental control and
substantially harmful to the state’s financial capacity. For such exceptional regimes, a corresponding amortization plan
must be adopted. Details for the budget of the Federation shall be governed by Article 115 with the proviso that the
first sentence shall be deemed to be satisfied if revenue from credits does not exceed 0.35 percent in relation to the
nominal gross domestic product. The La¨nder themselves shall regulate details for the budgets within the framework of
their constitutional powers, the proviso being that the first sentence shall only be deemed to be satisfied if no revenue
from credits is admitted.
(Article 110 - paragraphs 1 & 2) All revenues and expenditures of the Federation shall be included in the
budget; in the case of federal enterprises and special trusts, only payments to or remittances from them need be
included. The budget shall be balanced with respect to revenues and expenditures. The budget for one or more fiscal
years shall be set forth in a law enacted before the beginning of the first year and making separate provision for each
year. The law may provide that various parts of the budget apply to different periods of time, divided by fiscal years.
(Article 115 - paragraph 2) Revenues and expenditures shall in principle be balanced without revenue from
credits. This principle shall be satisfied when revenue obtained by the borrowing of funds does not exceed
0.35 percent in relation to the nominal gross domestic product. In addition, when economic developments
deviate from normal conditions, effects on the budget in periods of upswing and downswing must be taken into account
symmetrically. Deviations of actual borrowing from the credit limits specified under the first to third sentences are to
be recorded on a control account; debits exceeding the threshold of 1.5 percent in relation to the nominal gross domestic
product are to be reduced in accordance with the economic cycle. The regulation of details, especially the adjustment of
revenue and expenditures with regard to financial transactions and the procedure for the calculation of the yearly limit
on net borrowing, taking into account the economic cycle on the basis of a procedure for adjusting the cycle together
with the control and balancing of deviations of actual borrowing from the credit limit, requires a federal law. In cases of
natural catastrophes or unusual emergency situations beyond governmental control and substantially harmful to the
state’s financial capacity, these credit limits may be exceeded on the basis of a decision by a majority of the Bundestag’s
Members. The decision has to be combined with an amortization plan. Repayment of the credits borrowed under the
sixth sentence must be accomplished within an appropriate period of time.
(Article 143d) Articles 109 and 115 in the version in force until 31 July 2009 shall apply for the last time to the 2010
budget. Articles 109 and 115 in the version in force as from 1 August 2009 shall apply for the first time to the 2011
budget; debit authorizations existing on 31 December 2010 for special trusts already established shall remain untouched.
In the period from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2019, the La¨nder may, in accordance with their applicable legal
regulations, deviate from the provisions of paragraph (3) of Article 109. The budgets of the La¨nder are to be
planned in such a way that the 2020 budget fulfills the requirements of the fifth sentence of paragraph (3)
of Article 109. In the period from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2015, the Federation may deviate from the
provisions of the second sentence of paragraph (2) of Article 115. The reduction of the existing deficits should begin
with the 2011 budget. The annual budgets are to be planned in such a way that the 2016 budget satisfies the
requirement of the second sentence of paragraph (2) of Article 115; details shall be regulated by federal law.
Guinea; Constitution
Issued:2010; Article 75
(par. 1)
The National Assembly votes the budget in equilibrium. It is referred to [the matter] of the bill of the Law of
Finance by the Government no later than 15 October.
Nicaragua; Constitution
Issued:1987
Amended:2005; Article
112
The General Budget Law of the Republic has annual validity and its object is to regulate the Public Administration?s
ordinary and extraordinary revenues and expenditures. The law shall determine the limits of the expenditures of
the State organs and shall indicate the various sources and purposes of all revenues and expenditures,
which must correspond to each other.
The National Assembly may modify the Bill of the Budget sent by the President of the Republic, but no
extraordinary expenditures may be created except by law and through the creation and determination at
the same time of the resources to finance it. The Law of the Budgetary Regime shall regulate this matter.
Any modification of the General Budget of the Republic involving an increase or decrease of credits, reduction of
revenues or transfers among different institutions shall require the approval of the National Assembly. The
Annual Budget Law may not create taxes.
Table A8: Constitutional Balanced Budget Rules (cont.)
Country Definition
Niger; Constitution
Issued:2010; Article 114
The National Assembly is referred to the matter of the bill of the law of finance from the opening of the budgetary
session; the bill of the law of finance must specify the receipts necessary for the complete coverage of the
expenses.
The National Assembly votes the budget in equilibrium.
If the National Assembly has not decided within sixty (60) days of the presentation of the bill, the provisions of this bill
can be put into force by ordinance.
The government refers the matter, for ratification, to the National Assembly convoked in extraordinary session, within a
time period of fifteen (15) days.
If the National Assembly has not voted the budget at the end of this extraordinary session, the budget is definitively
established by ordinance.
If the bill of the law of finance could not be presented in a timely fashion to be promulgated before the beginning of the
fiscal year, the Prime Minister demands of urgency of the National Assembly the authorization to continue to receive
the taxes and to continue with expenditures, the budget of the preceding year by provisional twelfths.
Panama; Constitution
Issued:1972
Amended:2004; Article
270
In the Budget planned by the Executive Branch, expenditures shall be balanced with revenues.
Peru; Constitution
Issued:1993
Amended:2009; Article
78
The President of the Republic sends the Budget bill to the Congress each year with a deadline expiring on August 30th.
On the same date, he also sends the national debt and financial stability bills.
The Budget bill shall be effectively balanced.
Loans from the Central Reserve Bank of Peru or the Bank of the Nation are not considered fiscal revenue.
Loans shall not cover current expenditures.
The Budget shall not be passed without an appropriation for the servicing of public debt.
Serbia; Constitution
Issued:2006; Article 92
The Republic of Serbia, autonomous provinces and local self-government units shall have budgets, which
must outline all receipts and expenses with which they are funding their competences.
The Law shall stipulate the deadlines within which the Budget must be adopted, as well as method of temporary
funding.
Realization of all budgets shall be audited by the State Audit Institution.
The National Assembly shall discuss the financial statement proposal of the Budget upon the received evaluation of the
State Audit Institution.
Spain; Constitution
Issued:1978
Amended:2011; Section
135
1. All public administrations will conform to the principle of budgetary stability.
2. The State and the Self-governing Communities may not incur a structural deficit that exceeds the
limits established by the European Union for their member states. An Organic Act shall determine the
maximum structural deficit the state and the Self-governing Communities may have, in relation to its gross domestic
product. Local authorities must submit a balanced budget.
3. The State and the Self-governing Communities must be authorized by Act in order to issue Public Debt bonds or to
contract loans. Loans to meet payment on the interest and capital of the State?s Public Debt shall always be deemed to
be included in budget expenditure and their payment shall have absolute priority. These appropriations may not be
subject to amendment or modification as long as they conform to the terms of issue. The volume of public debt of
all the public administrations in relation to the State? gross domestic product may not exceed the
benchmark laid down by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
4. The limits of the structural deficit and public debt volume may be exceeded only in case of natural
disasters, economic recession or extraordinary emergency situations that are beyond the control of the State
and significantly impair either the financial situation or the economic or social sustainability of the State, as
appreciated by an absolute majority of the members of the Congress of Deputies.
5. An Organic Act shall develop the principles referred to in this article, as well as participation in the respective
procedures of the organs of institutional coordination between government fiscal policy and financial support. In any
case, the Organic Act shall address:
a. The distribution of the limits of deficit and debt among the different public administrations, the exceptional
circumstances to overcome them and the manner and time in which to correct the deviations on each other.
b. The methodology and procedure for calculating the structural deficit.
c. The responsibility of each public administration in case of breach of budgetary stability objectives.
6. The Self-governing Communities, in accordance with their respective laws and within the limits
referred to in this article, shall take the appropriate procedures for effective implementation of the
principle of stability in their rules and budgetary decisions.
Switzerland;
Constitution
Issued:1999
Amended:2002; Article
126
1. The Confederation shall keep its expenditure and receipts in balance in the long term.
2. The maximum of the total expenditures which may be budgeted shall be determined by the expected receipts, taking
into account the economic situation.
Ukraine; Constitution
Issued:1996
Amended:2004; Article
95
The budgetary system of Ukraine is built on the principles of just and impartial distribution of social wealth among
citizens and territorial communities.
Any state expenditures for the needs of the entire society, the extent and purposes of these expenditures, are determined
exclusively by the law on the State Budget of Ukraine.
The State aspires to a balanced budget of Ukraine.
Regular reports on revenues and expenditures of the State Budget of Ukraine shall be made public.
